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Drugged 
by Carl E. Schneider 
T he Supreme Court's recent deci-sion in Gonzales v. Oregon, like 
its decision last year in Gonzales 
v. Raich (the "medical marijuana'' case), 
again raises questions about the bioethi-
cal consequences of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. When, in 1970, Congress 
passed that act, it placed problematic 
drugs in one of five "schedules," and it 
authorized the U.S. attorney general to 
add or subtract drugs from the sched-
ules. Drugs in schedule II have both a 
medical use and a high potential for 
abuse. Doctors may prescribe such drugs 
if they "obtain from the Attorney Gen-
eral a registration issued in accordance 
with the rules and regulations promul-
gated by him." The attorney general 
may deny or revoke a doctor's registra-
tion if registration would be "inconsis-
tent with the public interest." In evalu-
ating "the public interest," the attorney 
general considers, among other things, 
"conduct which may threaten the public 
health and safety." In 1971 the attorney 
general issued a regulation requiring that 
prescriptions for controlled substances 
"be issued for a legitimate medical pur-
pose by an individual practitioner acting 
in the usual course of his professional 
practice." 
So far, so good; this is all common 
ground. The issues Gonzales v. Oregon 
presents had their origins in 2001, when 
Attorney General Ashcroft promulgated 
an "Interpretive Rule" which "deter-
mine[d] that assisting suicide is not a 'le-
gitimate medical purpose' within the 
meaning of21 CFR Sec. 1306.4 (2001), 
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and that prescribing, dispensing, or ad-
ministering federally controlled sub-
stances violates the CSA. Such conduct 
by a physician ... may 'render his regis-
tration ... inconsistent with the public 
. '" Interest. 
The Interpretive Rule did not pre-
empt Oregon's legalization of assisted 
suicide, but it did impede assisted sui-
cide, since controlled substances are the 
standard means of assistance. Oregon 
therefore asked the federal courts to 
keep the attorney general from enforc-
ing his rule. The case eventually reached 
the Supreme Court. What was the 
Court's task? 
A common public expectation was 
that the Supreme Court would-final-
ly-decide whether assisted suicide is 
good policy. That, however, is not the 
Court's job. There are some areas of law 
in which some courts are supposed to 
consider and decide what public policy 
should be. These are the areas in which 
state courts have inherited the "common 
law" authority of English courts, areas 
like the law of property, of contracts, 
and of torts (civil wrongs). In those 
areas, English courts made law before 
Parliament had become an effective leg-
islature. That authority persisted even 
when Parliament came into its own, and 
that authority was inherited by Ameri-
can state courts. In common law areas, 
courts principally apply precedent, but 
when necessary they are expected to 
think in policy terms. Even in those 
areas, of course, judicial decisions can be 
overridden by the legislature. 
The federal courts, however, have 
(basically) not inherited the common 
law power to make public policy. For 
our purposes, the federal courts have 
only two tasks-to interpret the Consti-
tution and to interpret federal statutes. 
So, was the Court's assignment in 
this case to decide whether the Interpre-
tive Rule exceeded the federal govern-
ment's constitutional authority? It could 
have been. The federal government's 
power is not plenary; it has only the au-
thority the Constitution accords it. Ore-
gon claimed that the attorney general's 
interpretation of the CSA exceeded con-
stitutional bounds and trenched too far 
on the authority of the states. 
Nevertheless, Gonzales v. Oregon 
was-basically, essentially, apparently-
not decided on constitutional grounds. 
Why? What did the Court think its task 
was? "The question before us," Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the majority, "is 
whether the Controlled Substances Act 
allows the United States Attorney Gen-
eral to prohibit doctors from prescribing 
regulated drugs for use in physician-
assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state 
law permitting the procedure." The 
Court was saying that the attorney gen-
eral's authority is not coterminous with 
the federal government's authority. He 
has only the powers he is statutorily ac-
corded. He thought the CSA gave him 
the authority to issue his rule. Oregon 
disagreed. 
If the issue was the meaning of the 
CSA, did the Court just consult the 
statute's language? No. Administrative 
agencies of the federal government regu-
larly interpret the statutes from which 
they derive their authority. Agencies be-
come expert in their work and in the law 
that regulates it, and courts routinely 
defer to their expertise in both areas. So 
when an agency's interpretation of the 
law under which it operates is chal-
lenged, courts may defer to it. But when 
should they defer, and how much? The 
Court has developed several "canons of 
construction" to guide it in matching 
the level of deference to the particulars 
of the situation. These canons of con-
struction are intended to help the regu-
lators, the regulated, and the courts 
reach sensible, consistent, and pre-
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dictable conclusions about an agency's 
authority. 
Thus, at the heart of Gonzales v. Ore-
gon was a debate between Justice 
Kennedy's six-justice majority opinion 
and Justice Scalia's three-justice minori-
ty opinion about which canon of con-
struction was appropriate and what it 
meant in the circumstances. In dis-
cussing opinions in this column, I ordi-
narily describe them in enough detail to 
make their reasoning clear. Here, how-
ever, that detail is prohibitively abun-
dant. To my way of thinking, Justice 
Scalia's characteristically sharp and lively 
opinion has the better of the argument, 
but it did not command a majority, and 
that's what counts. 
The majority opinion, however, has 
one final twist. The last paragraph sug-
gests that the dissent thought that the 
CSA "delegates to a single Executive of-
ficer the power to effect a radical shift of 
authority from the States to the Federal 
Government to define general standards 
of medical practice." That is, while the 
majority showed the federalism issue 
out the front door at the beginning of 
its opinion, it snuck that issue in the 
back door at the end. 
Unfortunately, this approach left the 
Court's federalism argument undevel-
oped and unconvincing. For one thing, 
the attorney general was hardly trying 
"to define general standards of medical 
practice." Prescribing controlled sub-
stances is but a sliver of medicine. 
Worse, the Court's view of federalism is 
singularly antique. It has been decades 
since the regulation of medicine was 
truly confided to the states. The federal 
government has long asserted-and the 
Supreme Court has long accepted-an 
almost maximally expansive view of fed-
eral authority. That view is the legacy of 
and condition for the New Deal and the 
civil rights movement. The Court has in 
two recent cases shown that that author-
ity has some limits, but those cases in-
volved statutes on the outmost periph-
ery of the constitutional reach of Con-
gress. And only last year (in Raich), the 
Court reaffirmed the New Deal case 
(Wickard v. Filburn) that most indul-
gently viewed the power of Congress. 
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More specifically, the federal govern-
ment has insinuated itself deep into the 
fabric of medical care. This is overdeter-
mined and inevitable. First, we now 
have a national economy nationally reg-
ulated, and roughly fifteen percent of 
that economy is devoted to health care. 
Much federal regulation that is not 
aimed at health care-like antitrust 
law-nonetheless affects it. Second, the 
federal government is now such a major 
purchaser of health care-through the 
Veterans Administration, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and so on-that its purchas-
ing decisions crucially shape much med-
ical practice. Third, the federal govern-
ment has routinely conditioned federal 
funds on the acquiescence of medical 
institutions to hosts of federal regula-
tions. Many of those regulations pene-
trate far into the world of medical actors 
and their patients. Consider the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountabili-
ty Act, that burdensome federal regime 
for a core part of medical ethics-confi-
dentiality. 
Fourth, the federal government has 
anciently and actively regulated medical 
care. The CSA itself is an example, but 
an even older and broader example is 
the Food and Drug Administration and 
the army of statutes and regulations that 
surrounds it. For that matter, would it 
really violate federalism principles for 
Congress to institute a program of na-
tional health insurance? 
This returns me to my starting point. 
It is understandable that the press and 
public see cases like Gonzales v. Oregon 
in terms of their policy consequences. 
After all, they do have policy conse-
quences. And no one supposes that even 
the justices can purge those conse-
quences and their own preferences from 
their minds when they decide cases, 
even though they should and do try, 
with some success, to do so. 
Nevertheless, in America there is a 
division of governmental labor; different 
parts of government specialize in differ-
ent kinds of work. They have responsi-
bility for specific sectors of government 
and become expert in them. Thus the 
Supreme Court's metier is not to set 
public policy. It lacks the authority, ex-
perience, expertise, and information to 
do so. The Court's province (in part) is 
to ensure that the jurisdiction of federal 
agencies is clearly and predictably estab-
lished and to resolve disputes about 
what the Constitution's federalism prin-
ciples mean. These duties are more im-
portant than making a policy choice 
about assisted suicide, because a great 
deal in a great many situations turns on 
the precedent the Court sets in both 
parts of its special province. 
In short, one's view of a case should 
change according to one's assignment in 
the governmental division of labor. For 
example, when Michigan had a referen-
dum on assisted suicide, I was acting as 
a citizen and quasi-legislator, and I 
voted no. Were I the attorney general, 
however, I would not have issued the 
"Interpretive Rule," largely because pru-
dential (not constitutional) principles of 
federalism suggest Oregon should be 
left free to be a laboratory of democra-
cy.1 Yet were I a justice, I would have 
voted to uphold that rule because I 
think the statute authorized it and no 
constitutional provision prohibits it. 
Even if I uncompromisingly supported 
assisted suicide, I would have voted to 
uphold the rule. I would have done so 
because I would have wanted to protect 
the clarity of the canons of construction 
that the court has devised for analyzing 
agency authority and to preserve the 
principles of federalism that have been 
developed over decades of national de-
bate. 
So where are we now? Congress 
could amend the CSA to make the at-
torney general's authority to issue his 
rule plain. If the attorney general reis-
sued the rule, Oregon would be back in 
court arguing that the rule exceeded the 
federal government's constitutional au-
thority. At that point, the federalism 
issue that the Court dealt with oblique-
ly would be directly presented. 
1. "It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country." New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) Q. Brandeis, dissenting). 
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